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Robert E. Looney 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of declin-
ing oil revenues on the Saudi Arabian economy during the remainder of 
this decade and up to 1992. In particular, the paper examines whether or 
not the Saudi Arabian government will be able to sustain expansion in 
private sector activity and, if so, under what conditions. 
For this purpose: 
I. A general assessment was made of the current problems and growth 
potential of the major areas of private sector activity. Here particular 
attention was given to the effectiveness of government expenditures 
in stimulating private sector investment. 
2. Based on this assessment, together with an analysis of the major 
trends in the economy and the impact government expenditures have 
had on the various productive sectors, a macroeconomic model of the 
economy was constructed. 
3. Linkages between the overall rate of economic growth and public 
sector budgetary allocations were established. 
4. Finally, the pattern of private sector activity was forecast over the 
period of 1992 by means of several optimal control simulations. 1 
These allocations were checked in terms of their consistency with the 
country's likely overall level of foreign assets and the government's 
concern with maintaining a safe level of national security through 
continued high budgetary allocations to defense. 
1. For background on optimal control techniques see the discussion in Homa Motamen, 
Expenditure of Oil Revenue: An Optimal Control Approach with Application to the 
Iranian Economy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), and the references therein. 
Dr. Robert E. Looney is a faculty member in the National Security Affairs 
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School:Monterey, California. 
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In this context, a secondary purpose of the analysis below was to exam-
ine the budgetary ramifications of various alternative oil revenue scenarios. 
Specifically, we were interested in determining the sensitivity and reliance 
of the various private sector activities-agriculture, construction, industry, 
etc.-on varying levels of government expenditures. Can the private sector 
continue to expand or even to maintain its present levels in an era of rela-
tive government fiscal austerity? 
General Constraints on Private Sector Activity 
Saudi Arabia is a country of immense diversity and, until at least the 
period of the post 1973-74 oil boom, remained fragmented geographically 
and economically. In general, because of its relatively small population the 
kingdom suffers from small market size, which denies many local pro-
ducers the advantages of economies of scale. Furthermore, since producers 
are dispersed geographically, they suffer from relatively high transporta-
tion and communication costs, which tend to limit opportunities for 
production-based export trade. These elements certainly have tended to 
reduce the private rate of return on many types of investment, thereby 
enhancing the potential for an active government role. 
In addition, despite diversification, the kingdom has tended to depend 
to a large degree on oil products and perhaps the pilgrimage for foreign 
exchange earnings. As such, the country is highly vulnerable to the vagar-
ies of external economic developments that, in turn, create the need for 
government intervention. 
On the positive side, of course, the development of hydrocarbons has 
meant that the country has not had to deplete available resources which 
could have been diverted to capital formation to finance oil imports. In 
addition, the kingdom differs from most developing countries in that the 
economy is generally more open, so that a priori one would expect finan-
cial crowding out of private investment to be relatively less of a problem to 
the extent that domestic residents can have access to foreign financial mar-
kets when there is an excess demand for credit. It could also be argued that 
because of the small size of the country the government is more able to 
dominate the economy and thereby, total domestic capital formation. 
One striking pattern characterizing Saudi Arabia's development has 
been the rapid expansion of government expenditures. In particular, gov-
ernment investment as a percent of total investment increased from slightly 
under 7 percent in 1960 to 42.9 percent in 1965, 53.3 percent in 1970, and 
72.6 percent in 1980. The public sector's share in investment has declined 
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Table 1 Saudi Arabia: Relative Shares of Public and Private Sector 
Expenditures, 1960-1985, by Percent 
Total Investment Total Consumption Total Expenditures 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector 
1960 6.7 93.3 20.2 79.8 18.7 81.3 
1961 19.3 80.7 21.9 78.1 21.5 78.5 
1962 23.4 76.6 24.3 75.7 24.1 75.9 
1963 31.5 68.5 31.1 68.8 31.2 68.8 
1964 42.2 57.8 33.5 66.5 35.4 64.6 
1965 42.9 57.1 36.2 63.8 37.9 62.1 
1966 40.4 59.6 38.8 61.2 39.2 60.8 
1967 55.4 45.6 40.0 60.0 43.6 56.4 
l968 60.5 39.5 37.5 62.5 42.8 57.2 
1969 56.3 43.7 36.1 63.9 40.1 59.9 
1970 53.3 46.7 36.9 63.1 40.1 59.9 
1971 41.1 48.9 72.2 62.8 39.8 60.2 
1972 52.7 27.3 38.3 61.7 41.1 58.9 
1973 54.4 45.6 40.3 59.7 43.4 56.6 
1974 59.2 40.8 50.1 49.9 52.1 47.0 
1975 52.5 47.5 46.9 53.1 48.5 51.5 
1976 62.2 37.8 54.7 45.3 57.3 42.7 
1977 62.3 37.7 54.4 45.6 57.3 42.7 
1978 68.8 31.2 46.3 53.8 54.5 45.5 
1979 71.7 28.3 47.1 52.9 56.0 44.0 
1980 72.6 27.4 43.1 56.9 52.6 47.4 
1981 70.0 30.0 41.7 58.3 50.9 49.1 
1982 67.3 32.7 50.4 49.6 55.4 44.5 
1983 66.0 34.0 48.0 52.0 53.0 47.0 
1984 56.5 43.5 45.9 54.1 48.7 51.3 
1985 54.2 45.8 45.1 54.9 47.3 52.7 
Source: Computed from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
somewhat to 54.2 percent owing to the oil price declines. Similarly, public 
sector consumption increased from slightly over 20 percent of total con-
sumption in 1960 to 36.5 percent in 1965, 46.9 percent in 1975, and 50.4 
percent in 1982. Again, this share fell slightly to 45.1 percent in 1985 
owing to the decline in oil revenues. 
The net result is that the expenditures of the public sector have risen as a 
percent of total expenditures from around 20 percent in 1960 to slightly 
over 50 percent in 1985. 
This growth in the government sector has apparently not been at the 
expense of the private sector, with overall private sector investment expand-
ing at slightly under 9.8 percent per annum over the 1965-85 period 
(Table 2). 
In general, therefore, despite the huge fall in receipts, overall govern-
ment spending has declined by a fairly small amount since the early 1980s. 
Within the total, however, there has been a steady increase in current 
expenditure and a decrease in spending on new projects. It is, therefore, 
the contractors that have been hardest hit, and the problems they have felt 
have been fed through to importers and manufacturers of building materi-
als and equipment and finally to all other sectors of the economy. 2 
Recent Developments 
As noted, Saudi Arabia has been experiencing widely fluctuating oil mar-
kets. This problem was particularly severe in 1986, when the decline in oil 
prices from a high of $28 a barrel in January 1986 to a low of $8 at mid-
year called for a radical restructuring in several areas of the economy and 
adminisuation. 
An indication of the seriousness of the decline in the oil market became 
apparent in March 1986 when the 1986/87 national budget was deferred 
for at least five months, with public spending continuing at the average 
monthly level of 1985. In August 1986 the budget was deferred again 
because of the difficulty of predicting national revenues at a time of great 
uncertainty in the oil markets. 
When the budget was announced on December 31, 1986, it contained a 
surprisingly high expenditure level of SR 170,000 million ($43,335 mil-
lion), only 6 percent below that allocated in the previous fiscal year. There 
were also substantial allocations for capital projects-SR 50,000 ($13,335 
million)-and for operations and maintenance-SR 20,000 ($5,335 mil-
lion). The single largest allocation was once again for defense and security, 
which got SR 60,800 million ($16,215 million). 
The OPEC accord reached in Geneva in December enabled the king-
dom to set a higher target for oil revenues in 1987 than in fiscal 1986/86. 
At SR 65,200 million ($17 ,390), estimated oil earnings are up 6.5 percent, 
representing more than 5 5 percent of total government revenues. The rest 
will come from investment income-estimated at about $8 billion-and 
from reserves. 
2. Michael Fidd, "Weathering the Storm," Financial Times (April 21, 1986), p. I. 
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The budget allows for a deficit of SR 52,700 million ($14,055 million). 
In the previous budget no deficit was foreseen, but a $14,000 million 
shortfall was incurred. Avoiding borrowing or politically sensitive tax mea-
sures, this year's deficit will be made up from reserves estimated at around 
$90 billion. (This figure is not official, as the Saudi leadership has never 
released figures concerning the size and composition of its portfolio. The 
figure is, however, widely viewed as reflecting the approximate size of the 
government's foreign assets.) 
Presumably these projections will reassure the country's private sector 
that the bottom has been reached in prices and production, and that hence 
the government will press ahead with the Fourth Five Year Development 
Plan-which began in 1985-without depleting reserves to levels that 
would be imprudent. The new oil strategy implemented in late 1986, 
which centered on a price of $18 a barrel, appears to be holding. Saudi 
Arabia's King Fahd has inditated numerous times that he would like to see 
prices remain stable for at least two years. • 
Realistically, however, it is likely that the government will face declining 
or at best slightly improving oil markets over the next several years. Clearly, 
the major problem currently facing the government is how best to utilize 
its dwindling oil revenues to generate positive overall rates of economic 
growth while at the same time meeting to the fullest extent possible the 
basic needs of the majority of the population. 
Impact of Government Expenditures on Private Sector Investment 
While the economic development literature has generally accepted the 
notion that increased government expenditures can stimulate private sector 
investment, some debate still centers around the relative merits of one 
variant of this strategy-Hirschman's policy of unbalanced growth. 3 
Tersely put, Hirschman advocated that in countries where the private sector 
is somewhat squeamish about risk-taking, the government stimulates pri-
vate sector capital formation through massive investments in infrastruc-
ture. Presumably, the government's investment in infrastructure would 
open up so many profitable areas of investment for the private sector that 
the initial investment would yield an extra dividend of induced easy-to-
make or compelled decisions by private entrepreneurs that resulted in 
additional investment and output. In short, countries pursuing this strat-
3. As originally developed in Albert 0. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Develop-
ment (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958). 
egy are likely to experience abnormally high rates of private sector invest-
ment due to the incentives and pressures created by the government's 
investment program. 4 
While not explicitly acknowledged, Hirschman 's notions of imbalance 
and th<; creation of an environment facilitating easy decision-making on 
the part of the private sector underlie Saudi Arabia's development strategy. 1 
Since 1970, when the country initiated its first development plan, the gov-
ernment with the completion of the Third Plan in 1985 had allocated 
approximately 3 75 billion riyals to development infrastructure (during 
most of this period the exchange rate was around 3. 5 Rls to the U.S. 
dollar). 
Owing both to an exhaustion of new infrastructure projects and falling 
oil revenues, this phase of infrastructure-led growth appears to be over. 
Does this mean that the private sector will find investment possibilities less 
profitable to the extent that there is a general contraction in the private 
sector's contribution to overall capital formation: In particular, we are 
interested in determining: (a) whether government investment has acted as 
an independent (over and above oil revenues) stimulus to private sector 
investment; (b) whether the composition of government expenditure 
(between investment and consumption) affects private investment; and (c) 
the "best" specification of government expenditures in affecting private 
sector investment-i.e., whether actual changes in government expendi-
tures are more effective than expected changes in government expendi-
tures in stimulating private sector capital formation. 
Impact of Expenditures and Revenues on Private Sector Investment 
In examining the impact of government infrastructural and current 
expenditures on the Saudi Arabian private sector, a distributed lag scheme 
of the Koyck6 type of the form 
y = ax + byL + z (Equation A) 
4. An empirical text confirming this mechanism in Mexico is given in R.E. Looney and 
P.C. Frederiksen, "The Regional Impact of Infrastructure Investment in Mexico," 
Regional Studies (1981), pp. 285-96. 
5. Cf. Looney and Frederiksen, "The Evolution and Evaluation of Saudi Arabian Eco-
nomic Planning," journal of South Aszan and Middle F.astern Studies (Wimer 1985), 
pp. 3-19. 
6. L.M. Koyck, Distributed Laga and Investment Analysis (Amsterdam: North Holland, 
1954). 
was utilized. This formulation implies an exponential decay scheme 
whereby the effect of a once-and-for-all increase in government expendi-
tures (or revenues) and/or private consumption (ax) not only would influ-
ence private investment expenditures during that period, but also would 
have (in declining terms) an impact on their level in future years. 
The results of this preliminary analysis were somewhat surprising in that 
a one-million riyal increase in government consumption increased private 
investment by 140,000 riyals in the same year. Eventually, private investors 
would adjust their expenditures on fixed capital formation so that in the 
long run investment would increase by 310,000 riyals. As might be imag-
ined, the stimulus provided by government investment is considerably 
lower in the short run, but is over double that provided by government 
consumption in the long run. 
Clearly, while the above results are interesting and provide some insights 
as to the relative strengths of infrastructure and other expenditures on 
Saudi private investment, they do not reveal· much about the manner in 
which the private sector arrives at its investment decisions. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature7 also is somewhat vague in this 
regard. Although there has been a great deal written on the role of the 
public sector in the capital formation process, and more particularly on the 
impact of government expenditures on private investment, the focus of 
most studies has been almost exclusively on the developed industrial coun-
tries. 8 In the case of developing countries, however, there was until quite 
recently9 an absence of a well-established theoretical framework for analyz-
ing investment and, apart from some isolated examples, remarkably little 
empirical work on the subject. 
This is unfortunate since many of the questions relating to the interac-
tion between the government and the private sector are just as important 
in developing countries as they are in the industrial countries. Indeed, one 
could argue with some justification that in view of the significant share of 
7. Cf. the survey in G.M. von Furstenberg and B.G. Malkeil, "The Government and 
Capital Formation: A Survey of Recent Issues," journal of Economic Literature (1977), 
pp. 835-78. 
8. The problem of crowding out in this context is examined in K.M. Carlson and R.W 
Spencer, "Crowding Out and Its Critics," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monthly 
Review (1975), pp. 2-17; and B. Friedman, "Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic 
Consequences of Financing Government Deficits," Brookings Papers on Economic Activ-
ity (1978), pp. 593--654. 
9. The major contribution in this area has been M.I. Blejer and M.S. Khan, "Govern-
ment Policy and Private Investment in Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers (1984), 
pp. 379-413. 
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the public sector in total capital formation, the degree and magnitude of 
the administrative controls over the financial system, and the limited access 
of private borrowers to international capital markets, governments in devel-
oping countries would be likely to exercise a relatively greater influence 
over private sector investment. Certainly, even casual observation of a 
country ~uch as Saudi Arabia would tend to support this view. 10 
. Much o~ the existing literature11 on private sector investment in develop-
ing countnes tends to argue that public investment involves both the devel-
opm~nt of infrastructure-which likely would be complementary with pri-
vate investment-and other types of consumption and noninfrastructural 
invesu~1ent _w~ich may. compete with private investment, either through 
absorbing lumted physICal resources or through the production of market-
able output. In the aggregate, the effects of the infrastructural and nonin-
frastructural components can offset each other, thereby yielding the 
impression that the impact of total government investment on the level of 
private investment is weak or insignificant. 
Blejer and Khan have, however, shown that once the two aspects of 
publi~ secto~ inv~stme°:t ar~ recognized, and a distinction is made along 
funcuonal Imes mvolvmg infrastructural and noninfrastructural invest-
ment and consumption, considerably stronger statements can be made of 
the role of government in private capital formation. 12 
A model along the lines suggested by Blejer and Khan modified for the 
unique conditions in Saudi Arabia was formulated and estimated. n This 
model is a variant_ of ~e .standard accelerator model, adapted to incorpo-
rate some of the insmuuonal and structural characteristics of the Saudi 
10. Cf. Adnan M. Abdeen and Dale Shook, The Saudi Financial System (New York: 
John Wiley, 1984), Ch. 1. 
11. In particular see V. Galbis, "Money, Investment and Growth in Latin America 
1961-:-1973," Ec~no'!"ic Development and Cultural Change (1979); P.S. Heller, "A Modei 
for Fiscal Behavior m Developing Countries: Aid, Investment and Taxation" American 
Econo'!"ic Review p975), pp. 429-45; N.H. Leff and K. Sato, "Macroecon~mic Adjust-
ment .1.n Developmg Countries: Instability, Short-run Growth and External Depen-
dency, ~eview_ of Economics and S~atistics (1980), pp. 170-79; V. Sundararajan and S. 
Tha_kur, . Public !.nvestment, Crowdmg Out and Growth: A Dynamic Model Applied to 
~~d1a and. Korea, IJ.f.F Staff Papers (~980), pp .. 814-59; and V. Tun Wai and C. Wong, 
Det.erminants of Pnvate Investment in Developing Countries," journal of Development 
Studies (1982), pp. 19-36. 
~2. Blej<;r and Khan, op cit. [Footnote 9]. See also their "Public Investment and Crowd-
ing Out m the Caribbean Basin Countries," in Michael Connolly and John McDermott, 
eds., The EconomieJ of the Caribbean Basin (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), 
pp. 219-36. 
13. The model together with its complete database is available on request from the 
author. 
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Ara~ian ec?nomy. A number of problems tend to limit the applicability of 
a stnct version of the neoclassical investment model to developing countries 
set forth by Jorgenson, '4 Hall,'~ and others, although there have been a few 
attempts in this direction. 16 By and large these problems make it necessary, 
as indicated by the Koyck results above, to modify the basic model to place 
greater emphasis on the effects of oil revenues in alleviating the effects of 
financial resource constraints usually faced by private investors in develop-
ing countries. Clearly, a proxy for expectations of the future economic 
climate also has to be explicitly introduced. 
To start, we hypothesize that the response of gross private investment to 
the gap between desired and actual investment, as measured by b in 
Equation (A), is not a fixed parameter, but rather varies systematically with 
economic factors that influence the ability of private investors to achieve 
the desired level of investment. 
We assume the ability to respond on the part of the private sector 
depends on two main factors: first, the availability of financing, 17 and 
second, the level of public sector investment. In recent years a clear consen-
sus has emerged that, in contrast to the case of industrial economies, one of 
the principal constraints on investment in developing countries is the 
quantity of financial resources rather than their costs. The rudimentary 
na.ture ~f capital markets in Saudi Arabia, however, limits the financing of 
pnvate mvestment to the use of retained profits, bank credit, and, in par-
ticular, government subsidies. 18 An increase in real credit to the private 
sector will, other things being equal, directly encourage real private sector 
investment, and by rolling over bank loans that maturity of debt can be 
lengthened sufficiently to correspond to the length of the investment proj-
ect. Subsidies either direct or indirect by the government to the private 
14. D.WJorgenson, "The Theory of Investment Behavior," in R. Ferber, ed., Determi-
nants of Investment Behavior (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 129-55; 
and D.W. Jorgenson, "Econometric Studies of Investment Behavior: A Survey," journal 
a/Economic Literature (1971), pp. 1111-47. 
15. R.E. Hall, "Investment, Interest Rates and the Effects of Stabilization Policies" 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1977), pp. 61-103. ' 
16. Cf. V. Sundararajan and S. Thakur, op. cit. [Footnote 11]. 
17. Int~rest !ate movements d~e to Islamic law are not a factor in inducing or inhibiting 
loc~l pnvate mvestment. There 1s, however, some flexibility in overcoming the prohibition 
on mterest. See, for example, Robert E. Looney, "Saudi Arabia's Islamic Growth Model," 
}o'!rnal of Economic Issues Oune 1982), pp. 453-60; and Mohsin Khan and Abba 
M1rakhor, ''Islamic Banking System in Iran and Pakistan,'' The Journal of Social, Political 
and Economic Studies (Fall 1986), pp. 317-26. 
18. Abdeen and Shook, op. cit. (Footnote 10), Ch. I. 
sector, while very important, are, given the data, somewhat difficult to pin 
down. For purposes of estimates here, they are assumed to vary more or 
less in line with the level of oil revenues. 
In Saudi Arabia's case, non-oil revenues consist largely of import duties 
and as such are a fairly good barometer of changing economic conditions. 
They are, therefore, introduced here as a proxy for the investment 
''climate.'' 
In general our findings 19 indicated the importance of the long-run dis-
tributed lag relationship between oil revenues and private sector invest-
ment. The strong statistical significance of non-oil revenues undoubtedly 
reflects the importance of the general level of economic activity on private 
sector plans for increased capital formation. Interestingly enough, private 
sector credit, the change in GDP, and the change in government invest-
ment were all insignificant in affecting private sector investment. 
On the other hand, the gap between actual government investment and 
the expected level of government investment was positive and statistically 
significant. 
Apparently, the Saudi private sector responds rapidly and positively to 
unanticipated increases in government investment. This response is much 
more sensitive to uaanticipated increases in government expenditures than 
to simple increases in government expenditures. 
The picture that emerges from these results is one wherein the Saudi 
private sector has responded strongly to the opportunities provided by 
expanded oil revenues, presumably through their long-run role in expand-
ing the country's infrastructure. 
The private sector also appears very sensitive to current economic condi-
tions as proxied by non-oil revenues. 
Finally, in this longer-run estimate, the private sector apparently 
responds rapidly to the stimulus of unanticipated government investments 
which may contain a significant noninfrastructural component. 
In sum, infrastructure investment appears to have played a strong role 
in stim~lating private sector investment as predicted by Hirschman. In 
~ddition, the private sector appears especially affected by unanticipated 
mcreases in public sector investment. 
On the other hand government consumption produced a markedly dif-
ferent pattern from that obtained for government investment. Here, while 
the change~ in both government consumption and investment are gener-
19. Again a detailed working paper containing the results of the regression analysis is 
available upon request from the author. 
ally positive and significant, unanticipated levels of consumption exert a 
strong negative impact on private investment. Apparently real crowding 
out of private investment, or difficulties in an absorptive capacity, occur 
largely in the form of unexpectedly large increases m government 
consumption. 
The results obtained above contain both optimistic and pessimistic 
implications for the Saudi economy over the next few years of slack oil 
revenues. First, the results confirm the leading role government infrastruc-
ture has played in stimulating private sector investment. The government's 
strategy of leading with infrastructure-with the expectation that this 
would, a la Hirschman, stimulate private sector investment-has been 
shown to be valid. The ongoing increase in real private investment in the 
period of oil revenue declines reflects this phenomenon. 
On the other hand, one major stimulus to private sector investment, 
unexpected increases in government investment, appears with the decline 
in oil revenues to be largely out of the picture for the immediate future. 
This can be offset, however, by a corresponding reduction in unexpected 
government consumption. 
It is not at all clear how long past infrastructure investments can con-
tinue to stimulate private sector investment. While the long-run impacts of 
government investment were shown to be strong, the extent to which they 
must be sustained to create adequate incentives for new private sector capi-
tal formation is uncertain. 
As noted above, the main thrust of the analysis below is to develop an 
optimal fiscal program designed to maximize the impact government 
expenditures have on private sector activity. The analysis rests on the pre-
sumption that Saudi Arabia can be characterized as a country with suffi-
cient oil reserves to have its longer-run economic future secure, but not 
enough current revenues to sustain growth rates in the ranges to which the 
country has become accustomed. 
The econometric, optimal control model of the economy developed in 
the next section attempts to build on the preliminary analysis of private 
sector investment, through identifying a specific set of governmental fiscal 
policies and their financial implications consistent with the achievement of 
both renewed growth and socio-economic improvement over the remainder 
of the 1980s. 
Description of the Model 
The model contains both monetarist and Keynesian elements, variations of 
14 
which have been developed for various countries. 20 
Ordinary least squares regression was used in the exploratory stage of 
model building, when much experimentation with various possible 
explanatory variables was undertaken to decide on the choice of variables 
and the form of the structural equations included. However, two-stage 
least 'squares technique was later used for the final estimations of parame-
ters of the model to correct for any simultaneous equation bias in the 
estimates. 21 The estimation procedure was carried out using the national 
account statistics for the years 1960-85 and the sectoral figures for the years 
1965-85. The national account and budgetary figures were deflated using 
the GDP deflater (1970 = 1.0). The model developed below is a simple 
simulation model, designed to incorporate the possibilities of both discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary policy alternatives. The first stage of the 
·model-the monetary block-contains 13 equations. 22 The main features 
of the model (Table 3) include: 
I. The money supply is a direct function of government expenditures 
(Equation 8, Table 3); 
2. non-oil gross domestic product is estimated by a quantity theory type 
function whereby the growth in real non-oil income is assumed 
dependent on both the rate of growth in the money supply and the 
rate of growth in velocity, and is inversely related to the consumer 
price index (Equation 10, Table 3 ); 
3. inflation is dependent on the growth in money, world (imported) 
inflation and (in the case of the non-oil gdp deflater) growth in 
income (Equations 9 and 12, Table 3 ); 
4. the velocity of money (Ml) increases with increased opportunity cost 
of holding money (as proxied by the euro interest rate and the 
expected rate of inflation). 
20. A description of the validity of this type of model is given in Robert E. Looney, "Prc-
revolutionary Iranian Economic Policy Ma.king: An Optimal Control Based Assessment," 
Economic Modelling (October 1985), pp. 357-68. A similar model dealing the Mexican 
economic crisis is developed in R.E. Looney, Economic Policy Making in Mexico: Factors 
Underlying the 1982 Crisis (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1985 ). 
21. Cf. Ray C. Fair, Specification, Estimation and Analysis of Macroeconomic Models 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), Ch. 2, for a rationale for this approach. 
Estimations were made using the TSP program developed at Stanford University. See B. 
Hall and R. Hall, Time Series Processor, Version 3.5 User's Manual (Stanford, California: 
B. Hall and R. Hall, 1890) for a description of the estimation procedure. 
22. The equations were estimated using two-stage least squares estimations to eliminate 
any possible simultaneous equation bias. Nominal exports, the rate of world inflation, 
and the euro interest rate were assumed exogenous to the system. 
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Table 3 Saudi Arabia: Monetarist Macroeconomic Simulation Model 
(Two-stage least squares estimations) 
(1) Growth in Oil Revenue (GGROX) = 0.85 GEN+ 0.49 GENL 
(9.27) (11.83) 
(2) Growth in Non-oil Revenue (GNOR) = 0.83 GGROX 
(2.6) 
(3) Growth in Government Revenue (GGRX) = 0.89 GGROX + 0.06 GNOR 
(9.37) (2.09) 
(4) Growth in Monetary System Foreign Assets (GMSFA) = 1.20 GGROX 
(8.37) 
(5) Growth in Commercial Bank Credit to the Private Sector (GCBPS) = 
0.45 GGEX + 0.15 GMSFA 
(2.28) (l.94) 
(6) Growth= Government Deficit (GGDEF) = GGRX - GGEX 
. 
(7) Growth = Government Expenditures, National Accounts (GGENAN) = 
0.48GGEX + 0.29GGENANX + 0.15GGROX 
(2.83) (l.98) (2.06) 
(8) Growth in Money Supply (GMIX) = 5. 71 + 0.38 GGEX + 0.27 GGEXL 
(2.04) (4.88) (3.68) 
(9) Inflation; Non-oil GDP Deflation (INFN) = 
0.58 GMIX + 0.38 INFNL - 0.45 GYX 
(5.94) (l.96) (-2.14) 
(10) Growth in Real Non-oil GDP (GYX) = 
0.62 GMIX + 1.04 GVMIX - 0.68 INFC 
(4.87) (2.81) (-1.79) 
(11) Inflation: Consumer Price Index (INFC) = 0.25 GMIX - 0.38 INFN 
(5.47) (2.10) 
(12) Growth in Velocity of Money (GVMIX) = 0.32 EUROR + 0.18 INFNE 
(2.11) (2.09) 
( 13) Expected Inflation (INFNE) = INFNL - INFNL2 
Exogenous Variables, World Inflation (INFW), Real Euro Interest Rate (EUROR), 
Exports (GEN) 
Note: L indicates lagged l year, L2 indicates lagged 2 years. 
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In short, the model links the money supply with government expenditures. 
The growth in real non-oil gdp was in turn determined by the overall 
growth in the money supply, and any increase in the velocity of money. 
The stability of velocity (and hence the validity of the quantity model used 
here) was confirmed by the fact that regressions of the growth of money on 
the growth of velocity were not statistically significant. 
The second stage of the model, the real (current price) expenditure and 
private sector block (Table 4), contains 17 equations in all. These consist of 
expenditure, private sector output, and identity equations. The transition 
from the monetary (current price) model was made by deflating govern-
ment expenditures, commercial bank credit, and the money supply by the 
non-oil gdp deflater. 
. One of the main features of the sectoral output section of the model was 
the systematic incorporation of military expenditures into a number of the 
private sector output relationships . 
Empirically, it appears (Table 4) that increased defense expenditures 
have tended to have a negative impact on non-oil manufacturing, while 
stimulating mining, construction, wholesale and retail trade, services, and 
the income derived from ownership of dwellings. The overall net impact of 
military expenditures on private sector output (not shown here) was also 
positive and statistically significant. 
In general, therefore, military expenditures have not been neutral in the 
Saudi Arabian context, but instead have retarded a key sector, while appar-
ently providing a net stimulus to several other sectors. It should be noted 
that based on the t statistic, military expenditures were more significant in 
most cases than either government consumption or investment expendi-
tures in stimulating private sector output. 
Similar exercises were also undertaken to determine the net effect of 
military expenditures on the major sources of demand. In particular, have 
increased allocations to defense ceteribus paribus diverted funds from 
investment? Using a distributed lag formulation, it appears that: 
(1) In general, military expenditures have had a net positive impact on 
overall gross capital formation and investment in the kingdom. That is, 
after controlling for government expenditures and oil revenues, increases 
in military expenditures have had a stimulating effect on gross capital 
formation. The same also applies to non-oil investment; here however, the 
size of the rnefficient (0.30) is over one-half that of government invest-
ment (0. 79). 
(2) Military expenditures do not appear to stimulate either total private 
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Table 4 Saudi Arabia: National Income and Sector Output Simulation 
Model (Two-stage /east-squares estimation) 
(1) Government Consumption (GCNP) = 0.20 GEXP + 0.60 GCNPL 
(5.04) (6.25) 
(2) Government Investment (GINP) = 0.22 GEXP 
(30.70) 
(3) Total Government Expenditures-National Income Accounts (GENANP) = 
GCNP + GINP 
(4) Private Consumption (PCNP) = 0.60 PCNPL + 0.09 GEXP + 0.23 CBPSP 
(3.01) (2.36) (2.10) 
(5) Private Expenditure (PENANP) = PCNP + PINP 
(6) Defense Expenditure (SIPRIP) = 0.46 GENANP 
(46.96) 
(7) Agricultural Credit (AGCRP) = 0.0134 GENANP 
(10.12) 
(8) Agricultural Output (AGP) = 0.97 AGPL-+ 0.42 AGCRP 
(22.61) (2.76) 
(9) Mining Output (MINP) = 0.31 MINPL + 0.0057 GINP - 0.011 SIPRIP 
(1.77) (2.40) (3.15) 
(10) Non-Oil Manufacturing (MUP) = -0.455 SIPRIP + 0.82 PENANP 
( - 2.38) (8.66) 
(11) Construction (CP) = 
0.46 GCPL + 0.14 GINP + 0.16 SIPRIP + 0.62 D75X + 0.04 
(9.27) (5.63) (3.91) (2.57) (2.10) 
(12) Transportation/Communication (TSCP) = 
0.29TSCPL + 0.24 MIP - 0.93 D75 + 0.31 
(4.04) (7 .84) ( - 6. 73) (4.04) 
(13) Wholesale-Retail Trade (WTP) = 
0.68 WTPL + 0.084 SIPRIP + 0.049 MIP - 0.37 D75 + 0.07 
(9.15) (4.06) (2.05) (-2.91) (3.10) 
(14) Services (CDP) = 0.03 SIPRIP + 0.04 PCNP 
(2.13) (3.70) 
(15) Finance (FOP) = 0.62 FOPL + 0.07 MIP 
(5.63) (2.77) 
(16) Ownership of Dwellings (FODP) = 
0.07 SIPRIP + 0.17 PINP + 0.33 
. (2.41) (2.43) (5.85) 
( 17) Private Sector Output (YP) = AGP + MINP + MOP + CP + TSCP + 
WTP + CDP + FOP + FODP 
Variables from Monetarist simulation model: Government Expenditures (GEXP) 
Money Supply (MIP), Commercial Bank Credit (CBPSP) 
Dummy Variables: D75, D75X 
Note: L indicates lagged I year 
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sector expenditures or private sector consumption. Again, government 
investment appears particularly productive in contributing to this source of 
private sector demand. 
(3) Interestingly enough, military expenditures appear to induce private 
sector investment, whereas government investment seems to crowd out or 
preempt resources that might otherwise flow toward this activity. 
(4) Military expenditures do not appear to impact nearly as adversely on 
imports as the overall level of government expenditures. 
(5) In the net, military expenditures appear to contribute more to over-
all demand than government consumption. The stimulating effect of mili-
tary expenditures on other types of government investment (especially in 
light of the negative effect of government consumption on investment) 
tends to reinforce this effect. 
In short, while it might seem apparent that shifting public allocations 
from military toward more "productive" activities would result in stimu-
lating or at least preventing a decline in private sector demand and growth 
over the next several years, the results presented above indicate that broad 
generalizations of this type, if not incorrect, are at least somewhat mislead-
ing. Military expenditures in the Saudi context appear at least to have (in 
addition to their security value) a number of significant impacts on the 
private sector, most of which are not negative. 
In particular, some private sectors of the economy appear to derive more 
of a stimulus from military expenditures than from other forms of govern-
ment allocation. The same also applies to the overall level of investment in 
the kingdom. 
The results do suggest that a careful shifting of government allocations 
from consumption to capital formation (providing profitable areas of 
investment have not been exhausted)-rather than across-the-board reduc-
tions in military expenditures-is the most productive policy open to the 
authorities for contributing to private sector expansion. 
Since the model was designed largely for the purpose of examining the 
impact . of government fiscal activity under alternative fiscal programs 
(associated with an assumed set of developments in the hydrocarbon sec-
tor), a relatively large number of public policy variables appear in the final 
estimated equations. More specifically, the model formulation allows the 
problems of government deficits, portfolio depletion, and public/private 
expenditure balance to be examined within the context of a set of simulta-
neous equations. Total government expenditures were assumed to be the 
main policy variable at the disposal of the authorities. 
As noted, the parameters of the model time series observations covering 
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the period 1960-1985 were utilized in estimating. The first part of this 
period can be characterized as an environment of fairly steady if not spec-
tacular growth, and the second half by significant structural changes in the 
government's revenue and expenditure patterns. As might be imagined, 
this period is characterized by an environment of high but extremely 
erratic growth patterns. Consequently, uncorrected for structural change, 
it is possible that some of the parameter estimates derived from regressions 
for the period as a whole would provide a description of what happened in 
the economy during this period only in an average sense. 
To correct for the structural shifts in the 1970s and 1980s, a number of 
dummy variables were introduced into the model. 23 As noted above, sev-
eral of the dummy variables-D75 and DX75-were statistically signifi-
cant in several of the simulation equations. The first dummy, D75, is a 
simple shift dummy, assuming historical values of 0 for the period 1960-
74, and 1 for the period 1975-85. The duquny DX75 assumed values of 0 
for the period 1960-74, 2 for the period 1975-82, and 1 for the period 
1983-85. The first dummy is a simple shift dummy reflecting the struc-
tural change that took place in 1974-75 as a result of the oil price 
increases; the second dummy is a bit more subtle in that it also takes into 
account the post-1982 oil revenue decline experienced by the kingdom. 
Both dummies assumed values of 1 for the forecast period. In order to 
determine the sensitivity of the results obtained from the alternative fiscal 
programs in the optimal control simulations, two contrasting24 forecasts of 
export earnings were made: 
23. The dummy variables were introduced to determine the nature of the structural 
change, i.e., did oil revenue increases in the 1970s result in shifts in the intercept of the 
regression and/or changes in the slope of the regression equation? The shifts associated 
with increased oil revenues represent quantum changes in expenditures, while changes in 
the slope of the regression equation arc indicative of the country's absorptive capacity for 
increased oil revenues. For a description of this methodology, sec Ragaci El Mallakh and 
Mihsscn Kadhim, "Absorptive Capacity, Surplus Funds, and Regional Capital Mobility 
in the Middle East," Rivista Internazionale di Science Economiche e Commerciali (April 
1977), pp. 308-27. Sec also Robert E. Looney, "Absorptive Capacity of the Prcrcvolution-
ary Iranian Economy," The journal of Energy and Development (Spring 1983), 
pp. 319-40; and R.E. Looney," The Impact of Petroleum Exports on the Saudi Arabian 
Economy" in Robert W. Stookey, ed., The Arabian Peninsula (Stanford, California: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1984), pp. 37-64, for applications of this methodology. 
24. These assumptions represent two extremes in the recent forecasting literature. Sec, 
for example: Samuel A. van Vactor and Arion Tussing, "Retrospective on Oil Prices," 
Contemporary Policy Issues Ouly 1987); Douglas Bohi, "Evolution of chc Oil Market and 
Energy Security Policy," Contemporary Policy Issues Ouly 1987); George Georgiou, "Oil 
Market lnscability and a New OPEC," World Policy (Spring 1987); Yasuhiro Watanabe, 
"Supply and Demand for Petroleum-Results for 1986, and Forecasts for 1987 ," JIME 
1. "Recovering Oil Markets": -16.0%, 1986; + 1.0%, 1987; + 2.0%, 
1988; + 3.0%, 1989; + 4.0%, 1990; + 5.0%, 1991; and 
+ 6.0%' 1992. 
2. "Declining Oil Markets": -16.0%, 1986; - 2.0% per annum over 
the 1987-92 period. 
These two oil scenarios are intended to map out the most favorable and 
unfavorable of environments in which government fiscal policy can be 
conducted. 
The Model's Use in Forecasting 
As noted, the model is driven by the values assigned to variables assumed 
to be exogenous to the Saudi Arabian economy and a policy variable, the 
growth in government expenditures given specified annual deficits. In 
terms of exogenous variables: 
1. World inflation is set at 2. 0 % per annum; 
2. The euro interest rate is held constant at 7. 0 % ; 
3. The exchange rate is set at 3. 745 Rls per $US. 
The maximum rate of domestic inflation consistent with the maintenance 
of a stable exchange rate was set at 5.0 percent per annum. Admittedly, 
this is an arbitrary figure; however, it was assumed that world inflation at 
2.0 percent rates over 5.0 percent would eventually result in a significantly 
over-valued riyal. 
Major Findings 
In simulating the economy to determine the sensitivity of the forecasts to 
alternative oil revenue assumptions and fiscal programs, the control model 
was set to optimize the level of real private sector output in 1992. The loss 
function was inflation, i.e., the optimal control model steered the econ-
omy on a path over time that resulted in a minimal rate of inflation consis-
tent with the values of the government's policy variables. As noted above, 
the chief policy variable (the design variable in optimal control terminol-
ogy) assigned to the Saudi authorities was the increase in government 
expenditures under alternative deficit constraints. 
The main findings (Tables 5 and 6) of these simulations were that: 
Review (Spring 1987); and Walter J. Mead, "The OPEC Cartel Thesis Reexamined: Price 





Table 5 Saudi Arabia: Macroeconomic Forecasts, 1986-1992, Fiscal Budgetary Target, $10 Billion Range, 





1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1985-92 
I Fiscal Deficit, Declining Oil Revenues 
(Billion$) 
-11.98 -12.52 -6.58 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -10.00 -69.10* 
Government Budgetary Expenditures 
(current riyals) 216.0 180.4 146.1 158.9 152.9 150.0 147.2 144.3 -5.6 
Total Government Expenditures 27.1 25.4 22.5 21.9 21.3 20.8 20.3 19.9 -4.3 
Government Consumption 19.3 18.2 16.4 15.6 • 15.0 14.6 14.3 14.0 -4.5 
Government Investment 7.5 7.2 6.1 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 -3.1 
Military Expenditures 12.14 11. 73 10.3 10.1 9.8 9.6 9.4 9.2 -3.8 
Total Private Expenditures 30.1 30.5 29.6 29.1 28.7 28.2 27.8 27.4 -1.3 
Private Consumption 23.8 24.2 23.5 23.3 23.1 22.8 22.6 22.3 -0.9 
Private Investment 6.4 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.2 5.1 -3.2 
Private I Government Expenditures -1.11 1.20 1.32 1.33 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 3.2 
Inflation (Non-Oil Price Deflator) -1.98 -6.62 -4.41 1.82 -0.79 -0.41 -0.32 -0.24 
Money Supply (Ml) 14.1 13.3 12.1 12.4 12.3 12.2 12.1 11.9 -2.4 
Non-Oil GDP 34.3 33.2 31.3 32.5 33.0 33.0 33.3 33.5 -0.3 
Government Revenue (Current riyals) 171. 5 133.5 121.5 118.4 115.4 112.5 109.7 107.9 -6.4 
N 
V' 
Fiscal Deficit, Recovering Oil Market 
(billion$) 
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1986 1987 1988 
-13.60 -9.10 -9.34 
25.50 24.28 23.86 
1.87 1.94 2.00 
0.25 0.24 0.23 
l.98 1.98 1.96 
7.03 6.51 6.24 
4.64 4.47 4.32 
3.80 3.53 3.48 
1.26 1.21 1.20 
2.23 2.12 2.06 
2.44 2.39 2.37 
9.58 9.14 9.22 




1989 1990 1991 1992 1985-92 
-8.26 -9.47 -10.00 -10.00 -69.77* 
23.56 23.65 23.97 24.43 -1.1 
2.06 2.12 2.18 2.24 3.3 
0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.0 
1.95 1.95 1.98 2.00 0.1 
6.09 6.08 6.15 6.27 -2.6 
4.21 4.16 4.16 4.20 -1.6 
3.47 3.54 3.63 3.74 -0.8 
1.19 1.20 1.22 1.26 -1.5 
2.01 2.00 2.01 2.04 -2.0 
2.35 2.37 2.40 2.43 0.0 
9.28 9.44 9.64 9.84 -0.4 
0.30 0.30 0.31 0.32 -2.3 
( 1) In general, inflation presents no particular difficulties in the range 
of expenditures likely to be undertaken by the government. 
(2) Given present levels of foreign asset holdings, fiscal deficits averag-
ing around $10 billion per year are probably the maximum the govern-
ment would be able to sustain over the 1987-92 period without recourse to 
external borrowing. 
(3) Private sector demand (consumption and investment) appears rela-
tively resilient, i.e., it does not decline nearly as rapidly as government 
expenditures during periods of declining oil revenues and/ or fiscal 
austenty. 
The most significant finding of these simulations was that private sector 
output as a whole is likely to continue declining and would regain a posi-
tive rate of expansion only under the most favorable set of assumptions 
concerning oil markets and sustainable levels of government expenditures. 
In part, however, this result is conditioned by the fact that much of the 
kingdom's major construction works is .now completed-the construction 
sector would contract irrespective of developments in world oil markets. 
(4) In all scenarios private sector demand will have to increase vis-a-vis 
that of the government to levels not experienced since the pre-1973/74 oil 
price increases. On the other hand, the ratios of private to government 
expenditures are not higher and in many cases are lower than those experi-
enced in the early-to-mid-1960s. n 
(5) Agriculture appears to be the sector activity capable of sustaining 
the highest overall rates of growth over the 1986-92 period. 
(6) Reducing military expenditure (given a specified budgetary target) 
does not stimulate private sector output growth. 
Implications for the Future 
Since the 1973 oil price increases, the central feature of the Saudi Arabian 
government's longer-run development strategy has been the need to use 
petroleum export revenues to place the economy on a high growth trajec-
tory that will eventually lead to self-sustaining private sector growth, a 
major goal of the government. This orientation, together with the oil reve-
nue forecasts summarized above, imply that the current financial crisis is a 
temporary one that is likely to be alleviated when oil markets revive in the 
25. As a basis of comparison the ratio of private to government expenditures averaged 
3.0 over the period 1960-64; 1.4 for the 1965-69 period; 1.3 for the 1970-74 period; 0.8 
for the 1975-79 period; and 1.1 for the 1980-85 period. In most of the simulations under-
taken here this ratio increased to the 1. 3 5 range. 
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early 1990s. Within this context, however, it is apparent that there is not a 
specific set of governmental fiscal-financial policies consistent with the 
achievement of both renewed growth and socio-economic improvement 
over the remainder of the 1980s. 
More significantly, it appears that-given likely developments in the oil 
markets and without major changes in national priorities (in terms, for 
example, of the willingness of the government to initiate external 
borrowing)-it is unlikely that the private sector will be able to sustain 
positive overall rates of economic growth over the 1986-92 period. 
Therefore it is clear that, despite vast amounts of public sector expendi-
ture since 1973/74, the kingdom's fortunes remain inextricably linked 
with the world oil market. The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1985-
90) has run into a number of problems. Despite government budgetary 
deficits of around $10 billion in 1983, '84, and '85, the Plan's targets now 
seem unrealistically ambitious. Nevertheless it still provides a pointer in 
the direction which the government wants to see the economy moving. 
One of the basic messages of the Plan is that the state, having made 
massive investments in establishing a modern infrastructure, wants the 
private sector to shoulder more of the investment burden and eventually to 
emerge as the maii:i force in the economy. The forecasts above show that 
under reasonably conservative assumptions concerning oil revenues and 
government deficits there may be fairly buoyant private sector demand 
(presumably based on past savings). If this is in fact the case, a key area for 
private sector growth is in non-oil industrial activity. Currently there are 
about 2,000 producing industries representing a total investment of about 
SR 60,000 million ($16 billion). 26 Given that local output currently 
accounts for only 15 percent of goods consumed in the kingdom-the rest 
being imported-there is room for expansion. Imports, which were down 
by 28 percent from 1984, were widely expected to fall an additional 30 
percent in 1986. Given relatively buoyant demand on the part of the pri-
vate sector, greater shifts toward local manufacturers than those anticipated 
by the forecasts above might be possible. If this is in fact the case, the 
overall rates of private sector output should be more in line with private 
sector demand. 
26. "Saudi Arabia: Revival Predicted by Early 1990s," Middle &st Economic Digest 
(December 20, 1986). p. 60. 
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